I can't take credit for the title of this post; it's from the title of a paper in ASCE's Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management:
'California's San Joaquin Delta Conflict: from Cooperation to Chicken'
You can freely read the abstract but will have to pay for the article if you are not an ASCE member. Here is a PDF from the senior author's WWW site. [Note added on 21 December 2011: Here is a 'blog version' of the paper.}
By the way, that's a picture of the Big Chicken in Marietta, GA. Seemed appropriate.
The paper is co-authored by Kaveh Madani and Jay R. Lund. Madani, creator of Water SISWEB and now an assistant professor at the University of Central Florida, is a PhD graduate of UC-Davis and a student of Lund's. Unless you've been living in a hole, you'll know Lund as one of the smartest guys in the room when it comes to Bay-Delta issues.
Here is their abstract [emboldening, italics, and red textare mine]:
California's Sacramento‐San Joaquin Delta is the major hub of California's water supply system and is central to the ecosystem of many native threatened and endangered species. Conflicts over the Delta have evolved over more than a century. This paper traces changes in this conflict in game theoretic terms, with its implications for the region's physical and ecological decline and governance. The Delta is not a zero‐sum problem and win‐win resolutions may exist if stakeholders cooperate. Game theory provides some insights on the potential for win‐win solutions. The Delta problem has had a Prisoner's Dilemma structure, where stakeholder self‐interest makes cooperation unlikely within a reasonable timeframe. However, the core of the Delta conflict is changing as the unsustainable future becomes more widely understood. Today's Delta problem has characteristics of a Chicken game, where cooperation is in everyone's interest, but is unlikely because parties deviating from the status quo are likely to bear more of the costs of a long‐term solution. The state of California may become the victim (or chicken) of the Delta game, bearing the greatest costs, if it continues to rely on leaving parties to develop voluntary cooperative solutions without a sufficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation.
So why am I posting this now? I had reason to reread this paper over the weekend. I last read it in late spring 2011. It made a much greater impression on me this time. Perhaps it's a matter of knowing more now than I did last spring.
What really made a mark were the Conclusions:
The Delta problem has evolved over time, from cooperation to Chicken. In the early 20th century Delta stakeholders agreed to cooperative solutions. Later fights over water allocations started and parties preferred to compete rather than cooperate. Yet, the Delta problem is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Since Delta stakeholders bargain based on their utilities from water, land, money, and risk over time rather than water shares alone, a cooperative win-win resolution which includes trading across resources and liabilities may be possible. However, the structure of the conflict with many stakeholders leads parties to not cooperate. A cooperative win-win resolution for a static Delta is unlikely in a timely manner, especially with so many stakeholders. This is a structural reason for failure of consensus processes to agree to an available win-win solution and the default tendency to retain the status quo.
Stakeholders' preferred decisions are likely to change with greater understanding of the Delta's unsustainability. The Delta is not a static problem and is worsening with time from almost all perspectives. Such changes transform the core conflict from a Prisoners' Dilemma to a game of Chicken The Chicken game is particularly devilish given the potentially abrupt transition likely for the Delta. Nevertheless, a cooperative solution is unlikely without external interference. Many parties will prefer keeping the Delta as is until fear of Delta failure rises enough to make the least risk tolerant player adopt an alternative plan. The dominant strategy for the player who will be chickening out is to chicken out today, as its losses can be lower today than after a collapse. However, since no party is willing to be the chicken, they wait, hoping to win the game, either by forcing concessions from other stakeholders or concessions or aid from the state or the courts, with the game perhaps prolonged by expectations of state and federal aid in the event of collapse, in a form of moral hazard.
Including the state of California (or federal government) did not fundamentally alter the game. For the cases examined, the Chicken characteristics remained and cooperation was unlikely. Adding the state to the game suggested that California can be the victim and loser in the conflict, bearing much of the cost of a Delta failure, due to its past failure so far to develop reliable mechanisms to enforce cooperation.
Whatever plan is adopted to fix the Delta in the coming decades, the Delta's sustainability is not guaranteed without powerful mechanisms which provide incentives for cooperation or penalties for deviation from cooperation. While recent efforts address symptoms of the problem, they have not yet solved a main cause - lack of effective and responsive governing mechanisms. California must 'govern' the Delta or eventually pay for absence of effective governance.
I could have put the entire text in bold italics but that would have been silly. I did put the last few sentences in red because I think Madani and Lund are spot-on with their assessment. I'm not prescient and I don't think I'm telling any Delta wonk what they don't already know.
It's about governance, or lack thereof.
Note added on 21 December 2011: Here is a shorter version of this paper from the California Water blog (thanks to Jay Lund). And a paper from Kaveh Madani - 'Game Theory and Water Resources'.
"My reading of history convinces me that most bad government results from too much government." - Thomas Jefferson
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